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ABSTRACT
Understanding Taiwan Presidential Election: A Review Paper
by
Shida Zhong, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2019

Major Professor: Dr. Yesola Kweon
Department: Political Science
This paper seeks to find a systematic understanding of the presidential election in
Taiwan. Based on the Taiwanese national identity issue as the main social cleavage, I
try to review the literature about Taiwan’s presidential election and find the factors
that influence the result of presidential election. I try to sort the factors into three
dimensions: issue voting, valence voting and social context. Meanwhile, this paper
also contains a brief introduction of democratization in Taiwan as a history
background and a short review on the past Taiwan presidential election. The purpose
of paper is to shine a light on the future research about Taiwan politics. In future
research about Taiwan presidential election, the joint impact of several factors such as
gender, civic society and social network should be paid attention to. Several factors
such as the attitude towards independence/unification and policy towards Cross-Strait
relations of both China and Taiwan should be traced with time to see whether their
effect changes. Besides, due to the uniqueness of Taiwan, the impact of relation with
not only China but also the US on domestic politics should be taken into
consideration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the result of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated
to Taiwan and lost the control of the mainland to CPC (Communist Party of China).
Since then, both sides of the Taiwan straits step on different development path not only in
politics but also in economy under two political entities: the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) led-by the CPC in the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan.
Since 1980s, Taiwan has started democratization. The year 1986 witnessed the end of the
Martial Law period as well as the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party
(DDP) as the main opposition party to the ruling party KMT in Taiwan, which is a
benchmark to a substantial progress in Taiwan’s democratization. Moreover, in 1996,
Taiwan had the first popular presidential election. Each president has a four year term.
Candidates from both KMT and DPP have the chance to become the presidents, which is
regarded as a typical symbol of democratic consolidation. It takes only 20 years around
for Taiwan to accomplish the transition from an authoritarian one-party regime to a
democratic regime.
This thesis is organized by five parts. The first part is the historical background. It
aims to offer more details of the democratization in Taiwan based on preconditions and
process as two dimensions. Next part is short review about Taiwan’s presidential election
since 1996 to 2016 including major candidates and their campaign strategy, along with
vital events during the elections. The third part is the theoretical explanation on what
influence the Taiwan’s presidential election. After these theories is the further research
direction. In the last is the conclusion section.

1

The theoretical explanation on what influence Taiwan’s presidential election
contains three major theories: Issue voting, valence voting and social cleavage. In issue
voting, the impact of four major issues on voters along with how Taiwan’s political
parties manipulate to accomplish their goals is included. In valence voting, both
prospective and retrospective voting are evident in voters’ voting choice. In social
cleavage, national identity as the sole social cleavage dominates Taiwan politics. In the
rest of this introduction section, the significance of studying and understanding Taiwan’s
presidential election is contained.

1.1 As a result of the unique process of democratization
Young but mature, democracy in Taiwan has become a unique case to study.
Huntington suggests three models to explain the transition from authoritarian regime to
democracy: Transformation, Replacement and Transplacement.1 However, though his
theory has influences over several democratization cases in other area, None of these
models is suitable to explain the democratization in Taiwan. Nevertheless, deeply
influenced by the traditional Confucianism, Taiwan never has any democracy experience.
Even worse, if we scrutiny the Confucianism, we may argue that the view about political
power, government and even human right in Confucianism is totally different to that in
democracy. For example, Confucianism argues the human-centeredness. It advocates the
loyalty to the emperor without any guarantee of human rights, In ancient China, the
concept of human-centeredness was to demonstrate the respect of humanity through the
affirmation of human nature. However, the concept of democracy derives the equality of

1

Huntington, Samuel P. The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Vol. 4. University
of Oklahoma press, 1993.

2

personality through the affirmation of human rights. What’s more, the democratization in
Taiwan is not accompanied with bloody rebellion or military coup. The more detail
process of Taiwan democratization will be contained in the next section.
Thus the democratization is unique due to the existing cultural value conflict and
peaceful but rapid pace. As a result of this unique process, the presidential election is an
essential institution functioning as the maintenance and consolidation of democracy. The
result of presidential election is also related to the evolving party system in Taiwan.
Political parties hold vital position in democracy. It is the political party that constructs
the intermediary mechanism between citizens and government. Also their interaction
guarantees the function of democracy.
Meanwhile, the dominant party in the authoritarian regime is easy to lose its
position after the transition. However, as the dominant party since 1949, KMT didn’t lose
the first popular election in 1996 after the transition from authoritarian regime to
democracy but was beat by the DPP in the 2000 election. The candidate from DPP
coming into power in 2000 also remarks the change in the citizens’ partisanship along
with the partisan realignment. The pan-Green camp led by DPP and the pan -Blue camp
led by KMT forms the basic framework of the party system. In these two camps, other
than the two leading parties, there are also several less influential parties which constitute
the party system. The competition between these two camps accelerates the consolidation
of Taiwan democracy.

1.2 As a factor influencing the prospect of international relations
Taiwan matters a lot to the world. The relation between the PRC, the ROC and the
US has impact on the stability of the East Asia. During the Cold War, this island was part
3

of the frontier of the socialism camp and the western camp. As Rigger argues, Taiwan is
a small island but global powerhouse. As shelley writes, “One final sense in which
Taiwan matters to the world is that it stands as a perpetual reminder of what is possible in
international relations—both for better or for worse. Taiwan offers proof that
development—both political and economic—is possible, but its experience shows how
fragile states’ independence really is.”2 Besides, the success of the Taiwan
democratization has underscored the advantage of the democracy institution, which can
be regarded as an indispensable case supporting the US-led global order. But on the other
side, what is more salient is the prospect of the Cross-Strait relation, which means the
relation between the two political entities: the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
mainland while the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. Since the PRC never gives up
the military operation as one of the solutions to the Cross-Strait relation, the military
threat has long been a “sword of Damocles” to Taiwan. Reunification has always been
the PRC’s advocates regarding to the relation with Taiwan since the One-China policy is
the basic principle and guideline in PRC’s diplomacy3. Nevertheless, in the discourse of
CPC’s propaganda, reunification with Taiwan is the historic task for this party to lead the
nation achieving the great rejuvenation in the new era.4 The great rejuvenation has long
been the goal of the CPC since it was come up in 1997. It contains several major goals
including developing the socialism with Chinese characteristics, accelerating the “new
industrialization” by advanced technology and cultivating the spirit of Chinese nation. As
2

Rigger, Shelley. Why Taiwan matters: Small island, global powerhouse. Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.
Statement from Ministry of Foreign Affair of People’s Republic of China: Taiwan problem and the
China’s unification (台湾问题与中国的统一) ：
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/ywzt_675099/wzzt_675579/2296_675789/t10531
.shtml
4
Highlights of Xi’s speech at Taiwan message anniversary event:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/02/WS5c2c1ad2a310d91214052069.html
3
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one of the most important part of the great rejuvenation, reunification with Taiwan is
essential to the spirit of Chinese nation according to CPC. On the other side, the result of
presidential election is out of the competition between the two camps. However, the two
camps have different view towards certain issues vital to the Cross-Strait relation.
Whether reunification, becoming independent or maintaining status quo is the major
attitude towards the relation with mainland. The presidential candidates are usually
recommended by the parties, which ensures their attitudes towards the Cross-Strait
Relations same with the parties. Besides, with the mainland’s characteristic policy
“Reform and Open-up” along with the Taiwan export-oriented economy, the economic
interdependence and cooperation is more and more frequent between the two sides. As a
result, the economic integration between two sides becomes an inevitable issue during the
presidential election campaign.

1.3 As a platform of pubic political participation
Moreover, the presidential election offers a vital platform of the public to participate
in the politics. The result of the presidential election is determined by the public’s choice.
Thus, the president is responsible for the public opinion. Focusing on the choice of the
Taiwan voters, we can find the public opinion as well as its changes. One of the most
salient parts of the public opinion is the national identity. As the key social cleavage,
national identity influences citizens’ opinion towards the prospect of Taiwan. The
attitudes towards relations with mainland China, whether unification, independence or
maintaining the status quo is the dominant issue. The cultural and historical acceptance of
China and the political acceptance of Taiwan constitute the inner conflict in Taiwan
citizens. With time going by, a generational effect is appearing. (Chen and Wang, 2019;
5

Li and Zhang, 2017) Instead of national identity inherited from mainland China and
prompted by the Chiang Kai-Shek regime, the national identity with more local Taiwan
historical cultural experience along with the democratization became the dominant. The
Taiwanese citizens’ national identity is closely attached to their partisanship, which may
turn out as one of the decisive factors in presidential election.
There is no doubt that Taiwan matters a lot not only in the democratization
theoretical perspective but also in the realistic international relation perspective. As the
institution generating the leader of Taiwan who may have influence on its development in
the next several years, the presidential election in Taiwan deserves more attention. But
before stepping further into the presidential election in Taiwan, a short review over the
process of the democratization as background is needed.

6

II. BACKGROUND: DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN
The democratization in Taiwan faced several challenges. After retreating to Taiwan,
the KMT had experienced vast administrative and coercive power which ensured its
ability to quench any attempt to form opposition. The conflict between the new coming
Mainlanders and the local Taiwanese was evident due to the huge gap between life style
and thoughts. What’s more, as Wong argues, the ultra-nationalists force from Beijing
twisted the statehood and nationhood questions in Taiwan.5Though facing these
challenges, the Taiwan democratization is rapid but peaceful. The transition from an
authoritarian regime to democracy is achieved without coup or massive rebellion. Before
stepping into Taiwan as a typical case, I will revisit the general theory about
democratization. Generally, the precondition school and the strategic choice theorists
hold the two extremes of the theoretical spectrum6. The precondition school argues that
democratization is a step of the sequential process of modernization. While the strategic
choice is a process of strategic political decision making wherein democratic institutions
are the products of negotiation, bargaining and ultimately collectively interested
compromise. However, the two schools are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they
are the two sides of one coin. In the process of democratization in Taiwan, we can find
several vital preconditions as well as the interaction between the ruling party KMT and
the opposition party. Though democratization in Taiwan is regarded as a rapid process,
it’s a gradual change with no valid and explicit departure point.

5

Wong, Joseph. "Dynamic democratization in Taiwan." Journal of Contemporary China 10.27 (2001): 339362.
6
Karl, Terry Lynn. "Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America." Comparative politics 23, no. 1
(1990): 1-21.

7

2.1 Preconditions
2.1.1. The characteristics of the KMT regime in Taiwan
The KMT regime in Taiwan was different from other authoritarian regime in several
aspects. After retreated to Taiwan, the KMT launched several policies and movement to
maintain its authority and legitimacy. These policies and movement set several preconditions for democratization. In politics, the defeat of KMT regime on the mainland
motivated a thorough political reform in 1950—1951 through which the party increased
its organizational capacity and developed a semi corporatists structure. 7 The KMT’s
political autonomy from society and its ability to penetrate social organizations and create
its own had several consequences for the subsequent political development. In economy,
the far-reaching land reform launched by the KMT from 1949 to 1953 changed the
ownership of lands. As a result, the land reform has changed the preference of
investment. It was no longer for landlords and urban capitalists to invest on land. Instead,
financing various small business and light industry become the new investment choice.
Meanwhile, the focus of these landlords and capitalists transited from the rural village to
the urban area. Before the land reform, landlords took the responsibility as the recognized
local leader in the village managing the local affairs. In the organization of the KMT,
Chiang Ching-kuo, the successor of Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of Taiwan, established
a commissar system within the military, which avoided the emergency of military coup
during the democratization.

7

Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard: ‘Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoretical and Comparative’
in Political Change in Taiwan ed. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Harggad. (Boulder Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers) p.1-33
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In sum, as the ruling party which led an authoritarian regime, there were some
difference between the KMT and other party leading the authoritarian regime. First, the
KMT did not advocate the principle of proletarian dictatorship nor the long time
monopoly of political power by the party. Second, the KMT regime permitted and
organized subnational political contestation. Direct elections for both executive and
council positions at the county, township and village levels have been held regularly
since 1950, which helped the formation of the opposition power. Last but not least, the
promotion of capitalist economy based on private property and a fairly wide scope of
market exchange led to social change and offered the economic condition for
democratization.
2.1.2 Economic Growth, Social Change, and the Political Sociology of the Opposition
Since the business in Taiwan are small and unorganized, they are also
beyond the reach of the government. The economic growth accelerates the social change,
which prepares the democratization. As a consequences of economic development, the
literacy rate and income per capita increased. What’s more important, a rapid movement
of labor entering in manufacture generated the differentiated urban sector and the
professional middle class. The economic development has several characteristics as
follows:
● The emerging bifurcation the political and socioeconomic elite overlapped
the subethnic division between mainlander and Taiwanese populations. Because

9

national politics was reserved for mainlanders, Taiwanese pursued economic
advancement and social mobility.8
● Capitalist development itself undermined the KMT’s institutional capacity
for mobilization and control. The rapid growth of civic and economic associations
was simply beyond what the KMT could monitor.
The main agents of political change in Taiwan have been middle-class intellectuals
who came of age during the period of rapid economic growth. The middle-class
intellectuals that fueled the democratic movement appeared to be connected to small and
medium-sized business via various social ties based on school, regional, and workplace
affiliation.

2.2 Process: Strategic Interaction between Regime and Opposition
The first phase in the development of the political opposition started with a political
reform movement, which was triggered by diplomatic setbacks. The second phase of the
development of the opposition, and the beginning of the democratic transition in Taiwan,
can be dated to the formation of an opposition camp—as opposed to the operation of
individual independents—in the local election in 1977. As a result of this election,
electoral politics became more competitive, and the opposition became the political force
named Tangwai (It means out of the KMT).

8

Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard: ‘Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoretical and Comparative’
in Political Change in Taiwan ed. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Harggad. (Boulder Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers) p.1-33
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Within the KMT, it is useful to distinguish between “hard-liners” and “soft-liners”.
The hard liners included party cadres in the internal security apparatus who were
concerned with the potential social disorder accompanying political change and the old
guard, who defined the KMT’s mission in conservative terms: staunch anticommunism
abroad, continued to recapture the mainland, and KMT dominance “tutelage” 9at home.
The soft-liners included younger cadres in the Department of Organization, a division
responsible for conducting elections and intraparty affairs, and newer, Taiwanese recruits
through the party.
A vital event that had influence over the strategy of both sides is the Kaohsiung
Incident during the martial law period. The 1977 Kaohsiung Incident was a major
conflict in Kaohsiung, Taiwan on December 10, 1979, International Human Rights Day.
The members of the non-party movements used a magazine named beautiful island to
organize a mass demonstration and speech on December 10, appealing to democracy and
freedom, ending the party ban and martial law. 10The violent shutdown in Kaohsiung
forced both sides to reassess their strategy. On the opposition side, the jailing of radical
leaders enhanced the moderates, who had argued against futile and costly confrontations
with the regime. On the KMT side, they normalized the political process while
maintaining various constraints on the activities of the opposition.
The hard-liner position weakened after the demotion of the head of the Department
of Political Warfare, Wang Shen, in 1984, who attempted to launch a military
intervention so as to be the success of Chiang Ching-guo. However, Chiang successfully

9
10

Roy, Denny. Taiwan: A political history. Cornell University Press, 2003. Chapter 3, p. 76-105
Ibid
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managed this threat.11 As a result, solid hard-liner was ebbing within the government.
Then the moderate leadership concentrated on rebuilding electoral support, using the
Legislative Yuan as an arena for bargaining. The moderate leadership of the opposition
also managed to extend its activities overseas. The very progress that moderate leaders
made in the legislative and overseas triggered a leadership crisis. Discounting the
incremental gains from either the legislative process or closed-door negotiations with the
KMT, Young Turs once again sought street actions to force the pace of concession from
the KMT. As a result of this revolt from below, many moderate leaders subsequently lost
their election bids in the 1983 legislative election.
On the other side, the opposition power developed from an illegal organization to a
legal opposition party. In 1970s political opposition to the KMT become known as
Tangwai movement. The benchmark for the agenda of Tangwai includes two issues:
greater democratization and the self-determination. The latter means that Taiwanese
should have the right to decide the relationship with mainland China. Independence is
one choice of this relation.
The factions among the Tangwai is due to their approach to realize their goals. The
moderates argued that political change was achieved through the political system such as
winning the election. The radicals attempted to launch large scale rebellion to force the
government push for the political change. There was little coordination between the
numerous Tangwai factions island wide until mid-1980s. Aware of their disadvantages as
nonparty vis-à-vis the KMT, Tangwai activists made several attempts to create

11

Roy, Denny. Taiwan: A political history. Cornell University Press, 2003. Chapter 3, p. 76-105
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organizations that would function as de facto parties without openly breaking the
prohibition. These included the Tangwai Campaign Assistance Corps formed after the
1977 election, the extracurricular activities of the magazine Meilidao beginning in
August 1979, and the Tangwai Research Association for Public Policy established after
the 1983 election.
Chungli incident as well as Kaohsiung changed the strategy not only of the Tangwai
but also of the KMT. The arrest of several major figures from radical faction in Tangwai
enlarged the influence of the moderate activists among Tangwai. Meanwhile, the open
trail of those arrested activists stimulated the empathy among the public which turned out
as the support in the legislature election after these activists’ release from prison. On the
other hand, Chiang Ching-kuo also realized that the forceful quench for these street
actions wasn’t effective. On the contrary, it would sway the legitimacy of the KMT.
Though the KMT led the economic takeoff during the last decades, the exclusion of ROC
from the United Nations put considerable pressure on the KMT. In March 1986, Chiang
portended the liberalization and rifted the Martial law through a new committee. The
negotiation between the two sides on legalizing the opposition political parties was put
into schedule. However, the Tangwai politicians were impatient to form an agreement for
two reasons: first, they wanted to utilize the advantages as political party to rise funds and
get support in the coming election. Second, the exiled Tangwai politicians attempted to
establish a similar party overseas. Those who were in the island were not willing to lose

13

their leadership of the Tangwai movement. On 26 September 1986, the Tangwai
politicians gathered in Taipei and formed the Democratic Development Party (DDP). 12

2.3 External factors: the international context and the overseas Taiwanese
Other than domestic factors accelerating the democratization in Taiwan, the
overseas Taiwan opposition movement also had impact over democratization. Two
aspects explain why the external factors can have impact over the democratization in
Taiwan. First, diplomatically, the Taiwan-US relation changed during the Cold War. As a
result, the US government’s attitudes towards the KMT authoritarian regime also
changed. This created the possibility for the overseas Taiwanese intellectuals and
activists to increase the visibility of Taiwan independence in the US. The strategic value
of Taiwan was recognized when the US ended the Korean War. To contend the Socialism
camp led-by the Soviet Union (USSR), the US government signed several treaties with
the KMT government and recognized its legitimacy. The alliance between the US and
Taiwan in this period ensured the autonomy of the KMT over the domestic affairs.
However, this was changed after the signing of Three Joint Communiqués13 between the
PRC and the US, which marked the normalization of the Sino-US ties. The strategic
value of Taiwan declined. Thus, the US government paid more attention to the human

12

Alexander Ya-li Yu, ‘Political Opposition in Taiwan: The development of the Democratic Progressive
Party’ in Political Change in Taiwan ed. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Harggad. (Boulder Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers) p.121-148
13

It contains three Communiqués: Joint Communiqué of the People's Republic of China and the United
States of America (August 17, 1982), Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America (December 16, 1978) and Joint
Communiqué of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America (February 28, 1972),
according to the website of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America.
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/doc/ctc/
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right issues in Taiwan, which created the opportunity for the overseas Taiwanese activists
to seek support from the US Congress and give pressure to the KMT government.
Second, the overseas Taiwanese formed their organizations and spared no effort to
make Taiwan issue with more visibility in the US by contacting the Congress and
influencing the foreign policy towards Taiwan. The organizations set up by the overseas
Taiwanese first founded in Japan but developed and expanded in the US. The aims of
these organizations were establishing democracy in Taiwan and seeking Taiwan’s
independence. The Formosan Association of Public Affairs (FAPA) was the most
influential among these organizations in the US. The majority of the FAPA’s members
are Taiwanese intellectuals with abroad education experience. The activism of these
organizations like FAPA was stimulated by several reasons. After retreating to Taiwan,
the KMT’s corruption and mismanagement deteriorated the economy in Taiwan. Its effort
to solve the economic problem, except the land reform, turned the situation even worse.
Besides, the conflict between the local Taiwanese and the mainlander following the KMT
to Taiwan was evident. What’s worse, the KMT’s control of national resources. These
resources include both the economic and political resource. Besides, the bloody quench
of the 2/28 Incident was significant to the Taiwanese opposition movements. Also, the
launch of the Martial Law made the opposition intellectuals faced risk of being sent into
prison or getting expelled. Thus, dissent and grievance spread among the overseas
Taiwanese.
Finally, the effort of the FAPA to contact and educate several representatives in the
Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the House finally worked out. On 31 May 1984. The Asia–
Pacific Subcommittee of the House held a hearing on the issue of lifting Taiwan’s Martial
15

Law. After the hearing, the Subcommittee passed House Concurrent Resolution 129,
which stated that the KMT government should speed up political liberalization and
democratization, especially by terminating Martial Law and other emergency articles, and
releasing political prisoners to guarantee and protect human rights.14Later, On 18
November 1985, the House Asia–Pacific Subcommittee proposed a Taiwan Democracy
Resolution. Without directly challenging the existence of Martial Law, the resolution
encouraged the KMT to allow an opposition party, to end press censorship and guarantee
freedom of speech, publishing, and assembly, and to work toward a true parliamentary
system of government. 15By influencing the foreign policy of the US, the FAPA pushed
the KMT regime to finally accelerated the political liberalization and democratization.
The influence of the overseas Taiwanese opposition movement was not limited on
the democratization. Their advocacy of seeking Taiwan’s independence shaped the
Independence/Unification issues in the presidential election, which will be discussed in
the fourth section.
Thus, the Taiwan democratization was the outcome of multiple factors. In 1996, the
first popular presidential election was held.

14

Chung mei kuan-hsi pao-kao [Report on SinoUS Relations ] 19831985 (Nankang, Taipei: Institute of
American Culture, Academia Sinica, 1986), pp. 1819, 192-193.
15
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III. SHORT INTRODUCTION TO TAIWAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
This chapter covers a short introduction of each presidential election including its
result, process and important events during the campaign. This chapter offers the facts of
presidential election result which offers the platform for the next chapters. Popular
presidential election starts at 1996 in Taiwan. Since then, Taiwan has witnessed six
presidential election in every four years.
In 1996, at the beginning of the first direct popular Presidential Election, Lee Tenghui, who was the incumbent president received support among the public, due to his
attempt to push forward the rapid democratization. As a result, he was in the advantage to
the opponent party DPP who advocated independence. In the election, the DPP
nominated Peng Ming-min who was an exiled intellectual with no experience in the
public office. During that election, Taiwan experienced the national security crisis caused
by the PRC. Which attempted to influence the result of the election. However, it also
made the Taiwanese suspect the prospect of seeking independence, which eliminate the
appeal of DPP’s campaign. Meanwhile, President Li got support due to the pride of
Taiwanese avoiding succumbing to the PRC stimulated by the crisis. As a result, Lee
Teng-hui won this election while Peng only won 21 percent of votes.
In the 2000 presidential election, the way for Chen Shui-bian to become president
was indirectly paved by Peng’s catastrophic movement in 1996. Chen showed his
potential when he served as the mayor of the Taipei KMT in 1994. Abandoning Peng’s
“Tragic Taiwan” 16appeal, Chen’s campaign team proposed the image of a self-made

16

Schubert, Gunter, ed. Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan. Routledge, 2016.p. 123
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“Son of Taiwan”17, transforming him from a dull defense lawyer into a manifestation of
youthful vitality and hope for the future. On the other side, the KMT nominated Lien
Chan as the presidential candidates. While James Soong, who left the KMT ran as an
independent. They became allies to compete with DPP. Soong led in the polls till the
media, in collusion with KMT broke a huge financial scandal. However, Lien did not
benefit from defecting supporters and he eventually trailed home in third with 23 percent
of the vote. Also, this is the first time that the non-KMT candidate came to power. It is a
vital mark in the Taiwan political development. 18
Encouraged by his performance, in 2000 as an independent candidate, trying to use
the catastrophic failure of the Kuomintang and Lee’s political retirement, James Soong
established the People First Party (PFP) in 2001. The PFP attracted many defectors from
the Kuomintang. But later it became an ally of the Kuomintang in the legislature, and in
2004 facilitated the joint vote of the KMT-PFP presidential poll. After lengthy
negotiations, James Soong agreed to serve as the vice president candidate for Lien Chan.
Troubled by governance problems (mainly after the split of the government) and in the
face of Taiwan’s first economic recession, President Chen Shui-bian was unpopular
during the reelection campaign. However, Chen has been very successful in using the
advantages of the incumbent to develop a campaign agenda, which is particularly evident
in legislation affecting the referendum law, and then he seized a clause to promote a
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“defensive referendum” related to “Taiwan identity”. 19The 2004 election was extremely
fierce and fiercely competitive. The two sides organized separate street gatherings with
more than 2 million participants in the election. At the end of the campaign, Chen Shuibian defeated Lien Chan/Song at the meager profit margin, 50.1% to 49.9%. After their
amazing and painful defeat, Lien and Soong led their supporters to protest outside the
presidential palace. In the days that followed, the crowd swelled to 500,000 and was in a
state of excitement as the Kuomintang/PFP politicians demanded Chen to step down.
By the end of Chen’s second term, the writing was on the wall for the DPP. Both
Chen administration had been wracked by governance problems, international isolation,
and corruption scandals. Not all of the problems were of Chen’s making. The KMT and
its allies, and in terms of cross-Strait relations, Beijing, were guilty of obstructing Chen’s
presidential agenda and pushing him towards extreme national identity positions.
Ultimately Chen would be jailed for corruption soon after leaving office.20 In 2008, the
veteran DPP nominee, former Kaohsiung Mayor Frank Hsieh, didn’t have advantages
compared to Ma. Hsieh gained the party’s nomination in part due to his performance in
the 2006 mayoral election for Taipei, which he lost by a small margin. The KMT
nominated Ma Ying-jeou, formerly Taipei mayor and Chiang Ching-kuo’s personal
secretary who had long been groomed to be president. Ma campaigned on a platform of
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improving the economy and thawing relation with China, with Hsieh focusing on
Taiwanese sovereignty and the promotion of Taiwanese identity. Ma easily won with 58
percent of vote.21
Since Ma’s policy towards China has made several substantial positive results in his
first term, he was perceived to win the reelection. However, he ran a campaign that
almost lost his advantage. He released the message and advocates to seek the peace
accord with China, which was misunderstood by the public, leading to the negative
feedback from the voters. The public though that the economic integration with China
advocated by Ma would result in the unification with China. Thus, Ma’s opponent from
DPP, Tsai Ing-wen got a closer position in the competition. After Ma dropping that
misunderstood idea, he focused on the economy and the relation with China. Ma Yingjeou’s attempt to achieve a partial free trade agreement with China, which favored
entrepreneurs of big business instead of ordinary people, as a result, those who still
suffered from the global financial crisis held negative attitude to it. Meanwhile, Tsai’s
campaign was more about economic justice. Other than that, Ma accepted the “1992
Consensus” that there exits only one China but with different about which political entity
is the legitimate representative. While, Tsai argued for a “Taiwan Consensus” which
advocates that bi-partisan agreement within Taiwan should precede further interaction
with China.22
A horrible failure in the local election in 2014 made President Ma step down the
chairman of KMT, but what’s more, it makes the KMT much harder or even hopeless to
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win the presidential election in 2016. Ma’s pursuit of a closer relationship with China
irritated many voters. The depth of Taiwanese people’s disapproval of President Ma has
severely damaged KMT’s chances of retaining the presidency. The scrimmage to succeed
him inside the KMT has exposed a lack of viable candidates and the escalation of
factional battles and grim succession politics raises the specter of splits that have
historically afflicted the party. 23 On the other side, the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen
advocated maintaining the “status quo” with China. She tried to get support to engage
with more grass-root voters, which helped her establish her image as a kind person so that
she could get more support.24 What’s more, as the first female president in the ROC’s
history, Tsai is bound to be an important part in the development of Taiwan democracy.
Through the brief review of the six times presidential election in Taiwan, it’s
obvious that the presidential election along with the party system functions well,
consolidating the democracy in Taiwan.
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IV.WHAT INFLUENCES TAIWAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
This chapter is trying to find an answer to the question above through reviewing
literature. I try to sort all the arguments into three dimensions: voters, candidates and
social cleavage. Among the three dimensions, I pay more attention to the third, because
of Taiwan’s uniqueness. This chapter starts with a brief review of three major voting
theories: rational choice, issue voting and economic voting. In social cleavage, the sole
dominant social cleavage in Taiwan is national identity. Thus, a short review of its
definition is included in this chapter. Election in is one of the most important institutions
in democratic society functioning as the linkage between political elite and the mass
public.
As one of the vital process, the voting behavior weighs a lot in the study of any
election. Several models based on various theories offer plausible explanation over the
voting behavior. Among which I select several branches of the theories that I think
related to the case Taiwan presidential election.

4.1 Issue Voting.
4.1.1 Theories
As Carmines and Stimson write “to speak of politics is to speak of issues”,25 the
importance of issues in politics is widely recognized. The question that this branch of
voting theory tries to answer is how the policies or issues influence voters’ decision. In
my opinion, three pillars underpin the issue voting theory. They are: voters’ preference,
the salience of the issues and the ownership of the issues. Voters’ preference towards
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certain issues is similar to points in a hypothetical space while the party’s or candidate’s
stance on this issue. Then the voters seek the closet point to their own and vote for it.
However, question about this argument is that the voters’ preference is not as consistent
as points especially when facing multiple policies. Instead, their preference is quite
various due to the variety in their intensity, which is based on their perceived knowledge
about that issue. 26 After the factors such as party identification, group membership, and
identities are under control, the preference towards certain issues still is influential to
voters’ choice. (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1968; Achen and Bartels 2017). Based
on the voters’ preference towards certain issues, several corollaries are drawn. The first is
that the voters tend to evaluate the candidates based on their preference. This evaluation
mainly focuses on whether the candidate can meet their expectations of the issue.
(Krosnick 1990; Lecheler, de Vreese and Slothuus 2009) The second is that the voters
tend to acquire more knowledge of the issues that they deem important during which they
also attain the candidates’ position about this issue. (Converse 1964; Holbrook et al.
2005; Iyengar et al.2008; Bolsen and Leeper 2013; Henderson 2014) What’s more, voters
tend to be more active if the issues concern about their own stake are involved in the
discussion.(Holbrook et al. 2016; Price et al. 2006) Besides, once the preference of
certain issue forms, it tends to remain constant. ((Krosnick 1990; Lavine, Borgida and
Sullivan 2000; Lecheler, de Vreese and Slothuus 2009) In this way, issue voting can be
understood as the result of a process of sophistication based on the voters’ preference.
Besides, the definition of issue ownership is also a multidimensional concept. The
ownership of a certain issue can be sorted into two types: associative ownership and
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competence ownership. 27The former refers to the identification of the parties and the
issues regardless of the capacity to achieve the issue goals, while the latter refers to that
the parties or candidates are perceived to obtain the capacity to deal with the issue. the
theory of issue ownership posits that the parties hold reputations for their ability to handle
certain issues. These reputations offer the candidates the reliability over issues associated
with their party. (Petrocik 1991， Campbell 1960; Norpoth and Buchanan 1992). Issue
ownership influences not only the voters but also the candidates. The issue trespassing28
occurs during the presidential election campaign. The ultimate goal of the issue
ownership is to get voters’ support. To achieve this goal, the candidates try to step into
other candidates’ issue area by coming up with more attractive policies and promises.
Context and the campaign process are two major factors that drive the candidates change
their strategy according to Damore David F (2004). The social context including the
voters’ perception of the salience of issues dominate what issue can be involved in the
campaign. The campaign process leads to the adaption of candidates ‘strategy in the
campaign.
Last, issue salience is also important in the framework of the issue voting. It’s
straightforward that the voters tend to make decision in their perceived salience of the
issue related to the candidate’s position. The argument concern about issue salience itself
is its measurement. With time changing, political participation online is more salient,
which offers the resources for scholars to conduct research based on more empirical data.
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One of the most important measurement of issue salience is the media coverage not only
traditional media but also internet social media platforms. (Epstein, Lee, and Jeffrey A.
Segal, 2000; Mellon Jonathan, 2014, 2013. etc.)
4.1.2 The manipulation and impact of issues in Taiwan
The issue is formed and manipulated by the interaction among voters, candidates
and parties. Two mechanisms maintain this interaction as I mentioned in the beginning of
this section. The candidates’ propaganda, campaign strategy influences the voters’
perception and evaluation. Meanwhile, the electorates’ cognition, perception can easily
fluctuate which offer the feedback for the candidates to adjust their strategy. For
example, the candidates’ decision to launch the “issue trespassing” is under the
estimation of how much support they can get based on that feedback. The “issue
trespassing” is a strategy that the candidates come up with more attractive promise on the
issue which their competitors’ owns so as to attract the voters who tend to support the
competitors. This interaction not only has impact on the behavior of both candidates and
voters, but also has impact on which issue becomes salient during the campaign. Issues
differ in their distance from the voter’s personal experience. Proximate issues, such as
personal economic conditions, affect the vote decisions of highly informed and less
informed voters equally. Distant issues, such as national economic conditions and foreign
affairs, affect the vote of highly informed voters but not less informed voters29. The
heterogeneity in partisanship in voters’ network influences voters’ behavior through the
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political discussion, leading to the defection of a voter with partisanship of a certain
party. 30
In Taiwan several major issues often become salient in presidential elections. Lin
Chiung-chu’s article investigates the role played by issues in Taiwan's politics during the
period 1996-2004. He exams the electorate's attitudes toward the unification of Taiwan
with China or Taiwanese independence (the UI issue), economic growth versus
environmental protection (the EE issue), the expansion of social welfare programs (the
SW issue), and social and political stability versus political reform (the SR issue). 31
Meanwhile, in Sheng and Liao’s research, they also estimate the impact of four issues:
wealth distribution, environment protection/economic development,
independence/unification, and reform/stability. 32With time going by, the impact of
different issue also fluctuates.
Debate over the environment protecting and economic development issue is focused
on whether building the fourth nuclear energy plant. The rapid development in the 1980s
deteriorated the environment, which stimulating the public’s worry about the
environment conditions. The violent conflict between police and citizens in Kongliao in
1991 was a burst out of the conflict over economic development and environment
protection. This incident was out of the KMT-led government’s plan to build a fourth
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nuclear energy plant in Kongliao. After this incident, citizens who concern more about
the protection of environment were more likely to support the DPP which weighed more
on environment protection. Thus, a polarized public opinion and party support formed.
However, as DPP won the presidential election in 2001, it changes its policy direction
also changed to focus on the economic development, which also frustrated voters who
advocated environment protection. After President Chen’s order to halt the construction
of the energy plant, there was political fight among the President, the Executive Yuan and
the Legislative Yuan over the construction of the fourth nuclear energy plant. The
compromise was finally reached among these three parties that the construction of this
plant restarted while the future prospect is a “nuclear free homeland”33 On the other hand,
the KMT’s position remains stable emphasizing the development. But in order to attract
voters, the candidates made promise about environment protection. In 2008 presidential
election, Ma Ying-jeou made the promise to decrease carbon emission, launching energy
tax and restoration of lands. The environment protection was taken back into public’s
concern when the nuclear energy plant exploded in Fukushima, Japan in 2011. As a
result, the KMT’s plan to enlarge the budget to accelerate the construction of the energy
plant faced serious concern from public. Citizen’s concern over the environment
protection lasts. However, as time goes by, citizens’ concern changes. They care more
about the air quality instead of nuclear energy plant. This change can be reflected in
citizens’ alley abandoning the proposal “Nuclear Free Homeland 2025”.34 But on the
other hand, though it advocates the environment protection, the DPP has to change its
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policy direction towards emphasis on economic development as KMT. As a result, both
parties tend to have similar position on this issue, which eliminates the salience of this
issue in the presidential election.
The impact of reform/stability issue is decreasing with the consolidation of
democracy in Taiwan, all the major parties tend to hold a centrist position emphasizing
social stability. During 1980s to 1990s, Taiwan was undergoing the transition to
democracy. Reform and anti-reform was the most salient issue in public’s focus for fear
of the instability with rapid political change. As Chu argues, during this period, Taiwan
government’s economic policies were successful in accelerating the economic
development and the distribution. 35Besides, during this time period, this issue’s
formation and manipulation is accompanied with the Tangwai movement and the
formation of DPP. As the opposition party, DPP tried to earn reputation and support by
delivering their impression as reform party. However, at that time period, Taiwan citizens
still perceived DPP as a radical and violent party. This violent and radical impression of
DPP was due to the radical movement in Kaohsiung in 1979. Even after the DPP won the
presidential election in 2000, its image was still a reform party according to the Cheng’s
study. 36 During his second term, President Chen Shui-bian launched a financial reform.
However, he and his wife seized this reform to corrupt and misuse the government funds.
As a result, Chen and several his family members were charged of these crimes. This
events led to Ma Ying-jeou’s proposal of legislative reform to monitor the administrative
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ethics in his presidential campaign. However, as time goes by, both DPP and KMT tend
to hold a centrist position towards this issue, which means that this issue is likely to be
congruent.37
Nevertheless, the welfare distribution has the potential to become salient. Welfare
distribution can become more salient because of the wealth disparity due to the rapid
economic development since 1980s. As a reform party, DPP came up with several
proposals about welfare. To compete with DPP, as the incumbent, KMT also made
several major politics towards increasing citizens’ welfare. For example, the KMT made
catch-all plans towards the welfare such as a national insurance program. However,
during 2000-2008, the DPP is the incumbent. Facing the crisis in economic and finance,
DPP was not so active in welfare distribution, which frustrated the supporters and
changed the vote choice in later presidential election. Possibly, different social class
holds different opinions towards this issue and seeking expression in political
involvement. Nevertheless, the Sunflower movement has reflected the impact of this
issue because the wider economic integration with China advocated by the incumbent
KMT government stimulated the concern of Taiwan citizens about the distribution of
wealth and welfare. This issue is going to be more salient if it is absorbed in the
independence/ unification issue.
The independence/unification issue is the most salient issue, since the parties has
clearly contradict position over it. The formation of this issue deeply rooted in Taiwan’s
history experience after the Second World War. Taiwan suffered from the conflict
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between the local Taiwanese and the mainlanders. The authoritarian KMT regime made
this conflict even more irreconcilable. As a result, a strong sense of “Taiwan
consciousness” emerged. This “Taiwan consciousness” met with Taiwanese advocacy for
the autonomy of Taiwanese. In other words, local Taiwanese hope to be in charge of the
Taiwan affairs and get rid of the KMT regime. Besides, the overseas opposition
movement also advocated Taiwan’s independence out of their grievance and dissent to
the KMT regime. They tried to form a distinct “Taiwan identity” to take the place of
“Chinese” by forming the subjective boundaries based on ethnicity and collective history
experience which I will explain in next section. So the independence/unification issue
connects to the main social cleavage national identity.
After the first popular presidential election in 1996, the salience of this issue also
fluctuated under different administrations. During his administration, Lee Teng-hui used
indigenization to weaken and split the KMT, removing Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang
Ching-kuo’s political legacy. Though addressing speeches, changing history textbooks,
He also tried to shake Taiwan citizens’ concept of “One China”. What’s more, by
fostering the Taiwan independence movement and changing the ROC Çonstitution, Lee
tried to establish the base of the de facto and de jure independent Taiwan. In Chen shuipian’s administration, he used “de-sinicization” as critical strategy to achieve the Taiwan
independence. eliminating the Chinese culture and fostering the Taiwanese collective
memory such as the 2/28 Incident. In 2004, right before the 2004 presidential election, as
the incumbent president, Chen Shui-bian used Article 17 of the referendum law to launch
a defensive referendum against the mainland. Though this referendum failed due to low
turnouts, it still led to antagonism between Taiwan and the mainland. However, after
30

winning the 2008 presidential election, Ma Ying-jeou came up several appeals so as to
melt the antagonism between Taiwan and the mainland. As a result, the conflict on
independence/unification was not so evident. The impact of this issue became more
endogenous, combining with more issues about social justice. However, Cai Ing-wen’s
victory in becoming the Taiwan president in 2016 intensified the
independence/unification issue since she indicated her support of the Taiwan
independence. Thus, the independence/unification issue never steps out of the stage, with
time goes by, this issue is still the focus of both the Pan-blue camp and Pan-green camp.
Since these two main camps have clear opposite position on the
independence/unification, this issue becomes a bridge connecting Taiwan citizen’s
partisanship. Taiwan citizen’s position on independence/unification also intertwined with
their partisanship according to Lin’s book.38 Political elites from both camps try to
attract the public in the discourse and propaganda. Also the public responses to the elites,
forming their own attitude towards this issue. The citizens’ attitude towards
unification/independence has impact over their voting decision as several scholars
argue.39 Also, in his research tracing several presidential election, Fell concludes that the
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DPP has a more pro-independence stance and the KMT has a more pro-unification stance
from 2000 to 2008. 40
In sum, the impact of these four major issues fluctuates as time going by. Since
national identity is the only social cleavage that dominants Taiwan politics, issues
absorbing this cleavage have the potential to be more salient. Meanwhile, the party
competition will be more polarized which also impacts the voters’ choice.

4.2 Valence Voting
4.2.1 Theories
In issue voting theory, the issue is positional which means different sides hold
various or even contradict opinion. However, on the contrary, in valence voting theory,
the issue is one-sided. 41According to scholars who focus on valence voting theory, three
principal heuristics that influence the voters’ decision. The first is the evaluation of the
candidates’ competence and responsiveness. The second is the voters’ view regarding the
most important issue facing the country and estimating the ability of candidates to handle
it. The last but not least is the partisan attachment. 42 In valence voting theory, two factors
inlfuence the voters’ final decision, one is the candidates’ policy position and the other is
the candidates’ characteristics. As a result, it is the voters’ evaluation of candidates based
on these two dimensions that has impact over their voting decision. Scholars pay
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attention to how the voters evaluate the candidates. Two models are used to explain the
formation of the voters’ evaluation of candidates. The first one is online model. In this
model, individuals adjust their opinion when encountering new information. 43The other
is the memory model in which individual holds their opinion based on their long-term
memory about the impression of the candidates.44
The economy is a typical issue in the valence voting. No matter how political
parties, presidential candidates differ in other aspects, they have the same desire to push
for economic development but with various methods. One of the most important part of
valence voting explaining the voters’ decision is economic voting theory, which contains
two sides, both retrospective and prospective. The fundamental assumption of economic
voting is that the voters reward or punish the incumbent government based on the
situation in both macro level and micro level of economy. Economic voting theory
contains not only the retrospective assessment of the incumbent performance but also the
prospective assessment of the government in the next term. Several findings are drawn
about the economic assessment of voters. There is a strong positive correlation between
voters’ choices and their assessment of the national economy conditions. (Lewis-Beck
and Stegmaier, 2000) Besides, voters’ decision is also influenced by their personal
economic experiences as major assessment. (Lockerbie 2008; Mackuen et al 1992) Other
inquired the relation between the assessment and voting choice by considering the
possibility of falsehood or endogeneity (Fiorina 1981; Erikson 2004; Anderson et al
2004; Evans and Andersen 2006; Evans and Pickup 2010; Hansford and Gomez 2015).
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These studies suggest that a person's scheduled vote will affect his or her perception of
the economy, not the other way around. In the comprehensive review, Anderson (2007)
described the inconsistent results in the economic voting literature as “emergency
dilemmas” because the impact of the economy on voting choices may depend on the
characteristics of voters and the electoral context.
Besides, the stability and the continuity of economic voting is also another issue
under debate. The influence of economic voting fluctuates with the age of the newly
established democracy. As Bochsler, Daniel and Hänni argued, the influence of economic
voting can be separated into three stages. 45 The first stage comes with the strong antiincumbency voting choice, regardless of the economic voting. After that, the second
stage is typical of the voters’ combination of legitimacy of the key democratic actors with
their economic performance. This combination is closely related to the support of the
incumbent. As the development of democratic institutions, the impact of the retrospective
voting is declining with voters’ more mature and deep understanding of democracy.
Other than this, the stability of economic voting is also influenced by the information that
the voter can get during the election. As Dean and Christenson argued that the diversity
of the information the voter can get leads to the variety in the assessment of the
retrospective economic voting. 46 The prospective economic evaluation matters a lot in
the decision making process of voters who are the most informed.

45

Bochsler, Daniel, and Miriam Hänni. "The three stages of the anti-incumbency vote: Retrospective
economic voting in young and established democracies." European Journal of Political Research 58, no. 1
(2019): 30-55.
46
Lacy, Dean, and Dino P. Christenson. "Who votes for the future? Information, expectations, and
endogeneity in economic voting." Political Behavior 39.2 (2017): 347-375.

34

4.2.2 Valence voting in Taiwan
On the one hand, scholars focus on economic voting in Taiwan. Hsieh, Lacy and
Niou supports that prospective voting was salient in Taiwan’s first popular presidential
election.47 Sheng suggested that both prospective and retrospective economic perceptions
were important in the 2008 presidential election.48 Tsai argues that Taiwan voters tend
to make the decision based on what the government plan to do in the near future. In this
research, Tsai also finds that Taiwan voters tend not to punish the incumbent in the first
term. A possible explanation is that the Taiwan citizens prefer gradual change of sudden
change. 49Focusing on the 1996 and 2004 presidential election and controlling ethnicity
and population, Choi studied the relation between the way that educational level and the
lifetime economic experience interact with the voter preference. Education and lifetime
economic experience jointly affect the impact of economic evaluations on individuals
vote choice. Those who became rich under the dominance of KMT were less likely to
vote against the incumbent in 1996 election, while in 2004 election they voted against the
incumbent DDP due to the short economy recession. 50The economic experience
influences the perception of both the performance of incumbent and the prospect of other
candidates. However, different from these scholars, Wu and Lin’s analysis showed no
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effect of economic evaluation. What they emphasized is that the Taiwan Voters’
perception of cross-Strait relations that matters more. 51,
Scholars also focus on the presidential candidates. Candidates’ campaign strategy
can guide voters’ choice. One of the reasons why the KMT was defeated in the 2000
presidential election was that the Kuomintang misled people into believing their
candidate was still leading in the polls, when he was really running third, and this
misinformation led people to vote differently than they would have otherwise, possibly
giving the election to the opposition party candidate. 52Candidates’ campaign and
performance can decide whether the candidate become incumbent. According to
Kieding’s research on the Ma Ying-Jiou’s campaign, by using the “New Taiwanese”
identity and the Taiwanization in his campaign, Ma appealed enough voters to vote for
him and became the president. However, Subsequent policies by his administration were
later seen as a surrender of Taiwanization, a betrayal of the civic and ethnic components
of identity, and this was perceived as Sinization. This partly accounts for the increase in
voter’s disapproval of him. 53However, in Wang and Chen’s research on the presidential
candidates in elections between 2000 and 2012, they found that there exists correlation
with voters’ evaluation of candidates and the voting decision. But partisanship can
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overshadow the evaluation. In other words, though some voters perceive that the nominee
is incompetent but still vote for him. 54
In sum, these voting theories, do emphasize the importance of information that the
voters can acquire. For candidates, whether they can deliver the information about their
issue ownerships and performance in not only economy but also other aspects as
accurately and efficiently as possible has indispensable impact over the result of election.
For voters, their voting behavior relies on their cost acquiring the information, which is
base to form their issue preference and evaluation of the candidates.
However, current voting theories are based on western democracy practice. The
development of democracy in major western countries is at least hundreds year old. As
young democracy with totally different cultural and historical background, Taiwan is
unique which means the western theories can’t fully account for its democracy. To be
more specific, the Taiwan voters’ decision making in Taiwan’s special social context is
deserved to be paid more attention in further research.

4.3. Social cleavage: national identity
4.3.1 National identity: Theory
This section covers a brief review on the argument about national identity along
with several research concerned about Taiwan national identity along with its
implication. National identity is a multidimensional concept. To understand the national
identity, it is unavoidable to involve several perspectives.
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Identity is a psychological term. But it is necessary to combine personal
psychological theories with social and even political issues. (Eric Erikson, 1994; Ross,
1999) For Erikson, identity is used to combine individuals with the social context. In his
study, he argues that identity is referred to the point at which the demands of the
developing individual-the adolescent-were met or failed to be met by the forms of social
life in which he or she lived. 55From the perspective of social identity, self is reflected in
the social life56. By sorting themselves into different category according to several
characteristics such as ethnicity, individuals identify themselves, forming their sense of
belonging, in which process the identity forms. By comparison between themselves and
the others, the similarity along with difference appear. In micro level, social identity
strengthen their fond towards their same members in the same categories while possibly
produce the antagonism against others. In this way, social identity constructs the “us” and
“them”. At the macro level, social identity offers a reasonable lens to understand the
group behavior. In research about political violence, genocide and civil war, scholars use
social identity theory to explain the dynamic of the irrational behavior under specific
situations such as Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka. Ross argues that the national
identity constructs a “moral agenda”57. In this way, national identity suggests the
members with the same national identity is responsible to other members instead of
foreigners. Besides, the national identity should be in the priority in the identity sequence
compared to other identities.
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Identity is the quality of any collectivity that leads its membership to identify with it.
58

Such identification is useful in political development in order to draw the boundaries of

the collectivity and to ensure the loyalty of its constituents. What causes the membership
to identify with the collectivity is to some extent an empirical question, but it includes
two broad dimensions: The first is characteristics of the individual constituents of the
group such as shared language, culture or ethnicity, leading them to identify with one
another; and the second is characteristics of the group itself, such as a founding, a
narrative history, and a role in international society, leading to a sense of shared interest
in the fate of the whole. 59Collectivity is a fundamental characteristic of national identity.
The collective memory forms the platform of national identity. MacCormick comes up
that the national identity is a cultural identity, based on his argument about nation. He
thinks that “a nation is constituted by a relatively large grouping of people who conceive
themselves to have a communal uniting past and present and capable of being projected
into the future.”60 In his study about Cambodian national identity, Milton Takei argues
that it is inevitable to scrutiny the Cambodians’ collective memory so as to understand
their antagonism against Vietnam.61 The notion “Mythscapes” presented by Bell explains
why the national identity can last through generation by generation. The mythscapes
constructs a realm for the myth, story and memory to be reconstructed, represented and
transmitted constantly. Other than that, Liu and Hilton come up with a “the representation
of history” theory. In their article, history defines a group’s and that group members
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amend and renegotiate historical memories around them. 62The collective memory and
historical experience are built into the national identity. What’s more, since it can be
understood and demolished in various perspective, history experience can be selective. In
this way, political elite in power can use the history memory and experience influencing
the national identity to enlarge their interest by selecting and filtering the history. As a
result, national identity can be amenable and changed in different time periods and
different conditions.
In scholars’ effort to seek the explanation of the definition of nation and nationalism,
a close relation among national identity, nation and nationalism is established though it
still has some ambiguity. As a standard setting scholar, Anthony Smith defines that “a
nation is a named human population sharing an historic territory common myths and
historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights
and duties for all members.” This definition points out the essential conditions and
elements for a nation. Based on this, he argues that the nationalism is “an ideological
movement, for attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on
behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential
‘nation’ like others.”63
Thus the relationship between nationalism and national identity is intertwined. The
national identity can be understood as dynamic of nationalism while the nationalism can
generate and strengthen the national identity in turn. As Montserrat Guiberrnau as
observed, “the strength of nationalism derives all from its ability to create a sense of
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identity.”64 Owning the recognition from others among the group as well as the sense of
belonging form the perquisite for the nationalism.
In sum, national identity is the individuals’ identity with the nation to which they
can have a sense of belonging from their common historical memory and experience.
Nevertheless, to explain the origin of nation and nationalism, Smith also offers a
fundamental typology theoretical approaches and fits them into four types: primordialists,
perennialists, modernists and historical ethno-symbolists.65Primordialists argue that the
nation is derived from kinship. As a result, national identity can be simply regarded as
ethnicity. Perennialists advocate that the nation is the constant existing in the human
history, which means that the development of nation in different stages of history is a
circle. Thus, the national identity never changes. While modernism argues that the nation
is constructed by the reinterpretation and selection of history, national identity in this
perspective is an outcome of consciously construction. Nevertheless, the last approach is
based on the perception that the nation is a cultural artefacts, which is more abstract
compared to other three approaches.66It is closely related to Anderson’s argument that the
nation is an “imagined community”67. Despite the disparity of these four approaches, they
also have similarities. The national identity can be regarded as “genetically” determined
or constructed. As a consequence, we can find that two major schools and their debate
offer useful lens to understand the formation and transition of national identity. They are
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primordialists and constructivism. Influenced by biosociology, the former argues that the
national identity is decided by the kinship, blood relations and the common ancestry. On
the contrary, constructivism argues that national identity is the outcome as the
representation of history. Thus, when looking into national identity in Taiwan, these two
major schools offer a lens to understand the current characteristics of Taiwan citizens’
national identity.
4.3.2 National identity in Taiwan: Transition and Manipulation
The work of Lipset and Rokkan has been highly influential for understanding voting
behavior. According to their argument, once the social cleavage is formed, it tends to
provide a durable basis for political conflict expressed through the ballot box.68Compare
to social class, the diversity in national identity in Taiwan is more evident. National
identity has been a dominating issue in Taiwan politics for a long time. It is the
Taiwanese over Chinese identity that constructs the social cleavage in Taiwan. In
Taiwan’s democracy consolidation, the main social cleavage is regarded as a vital symbol
that influencing the party system, citizens’ partisanship and the competition in the
presidential election. Thus, when it comes to Taiwan, it’s inevitable to talk about the
national identity.
As a key social cleavage that dominates Taiwan politics, lots of scholars pay
attention to national identity in Taiwan. National identity is multi-dimensional in Taiwan.
It contains two aspects. This issue should not only reflect in who the Taiwan citizens are
but also reflect in their attitude towards the prospect of Cross-Strait relations. Generally,
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the literature concerned about the national identity in Taiwan can be sorted into two
major branches. On the one hand, scholars put national identity as dependent variable and
seek explanation in its change and transition On the other hand, scholars put national
identity as an independent variable to seek its implication and influence on the CrossStrait relations along with the domestic politics.

Resources: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University69
As is shown in this graph from National Chengchi University, Taiwanese identity
can be sorted into three main types: Chinese; Taiwanese and both. What is evident is that
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since the beginning of this tracked survey, the identity as Taiwanese is increasing though
there is fluctuation. While the percentage of Taiwanese identifying themselves as Chinese
is declining. The majority of Taiwanese are identifying themselves as both Chinese and
Taiwanese. Several scholars try to seek the explanation of this. The literature can be
sorted into several branches.
The first branch is that the national identity transition in Taiwan is the result of
history process along with specific political events. The time periodization offers three
waves of national identity change in Taiwan.70 From the First Sino-Japan War till the end
of the Second World War, Taiwan is colonized by Japanese. During this period, Japanese
culture was forced by the authority to root in Taiwan. The Second part is Taiwan’s return
to ROC. During this period, the KMT regime carried out the Martial Law in Taiwan. The
last is the democratization process from the 1980s remarked by the end of the Martial
Law in 1987. The democratization in Taiwan changed the social environment. Brian Hall
establishes a model to explain the formation of Taiwan national identity. As he argues,
the emergence and construction of Taiwan national identity is closely related to the
modernization.71 It enlarges the contact among different ethnic groups which melts the
boundary between them. As one of the most important process of modernization, political
democratization spreads the idea of “equality” among the public. Thus, it also generates
the sense of relative deprivation and inequality. As a result, it stimulates the selfconsciousness. This kind of consciousness has fueled a more realistic pursuit of the group
members’ well-being. In Liao, Chen and Huang’s research, two perspective can explain
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the fading of Taiwan citizen identifying themselves as Chinese. One is that the political
events have considerable and continuous impact over young and well-educated
generations. Vital political events may cause the change in choice of national identity.
The political events that cause the decline of Chinese identity can be sorted into two type:
the first is about relationship between Taiwan and China and the second is that the
political leaders’ effort to distinguish the Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity.
Another possible but not critical reason, according to the authors, is that the gradual
passing of the first generation of mainlander (waishengren) who followed the KMT
coming to Taiwan after the end of Chinese Civil War in 1949. 72
The second part is related to the situation of Taiwan in the international relations.
Other than the domestic social change inside Taiwan, external factors can also influence
the national identity. As its influence on international stage increased, PRC took place of
ROC in the United Nation in 1971. Since then, influenced by PRC’s strong stance on
“One China” principle, the number of countries that keep diplomatic relations with
Taiwan decreases. The isolation in the international relations frustrates Taiwan citizens,
which leads to a wider separation between China and Taiwan in their minds. Thus, as
Zhong Yang says in his article, “State-and sovereignty-related factors especially external
factors such as international recognition, redrawn boundary and relations with mainland
China, play a crucial role in shaping the Taiwanese people’s new national identity.”73
What’s more, with the change of social context of both sides, the economic integration
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between China and Taiwan has been an indispensable issue. However, based on data
collected from 1992 to 2009, Chiang tried to seek the relation between economic
integration between the two sides and Taiwan citizens’ national identity. 74The increasing
of Taiwan’s investment in China results in an increase of Taiwanese identity. In their
research, both skilled workers and unskilled workers are included in their sample.
Compared to the skilled workers, the unskilled workers have a stronger Taiwanese
identity and tend to voter for Pan-green camp instead of Pan-blue camp. The disparity in
wealth distribution can account for this. Those unskilled workers can’t benefit from the
economic integration between China and Taiwan.
Other than these explanations, as the dominant cleavage, national identity was
functioned as useful tool for political elites to achieve their goals. It was strategically
manipulated. The KMT took over Taiwan from Japan at the end of the Second World
War. However, the relation between the KMT and the local Taiwanese wasn’t so
harmonious. Since Taiwan was occupied by Japan for several decades, the KMT regime
suspected Taiwan citizen’s loyalty. On the other hand, lacking discipline, several
conflicts between the KMT soldiers and local Taiwanese happened. A negative
impression of the KMT formed in the minds of Taiwanese.
From February 27th to May 16th, 1947, massive anti-government and bloody quench
from government happened in Taiwan. On February 27th, the KMT investigator suspected
a Taiwanese widow of selling contraband cigarettes, and beat her, which ignited the
dissatisfaction the crowd. Massive anti-government rally and protest was organized on
February 28th in Taipei. Then, the anti-government uprising spread to other cities. The
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KMT regime sent police and soldiers to quench the protest by violence. Numerous
citizens were killed or injured. Since the uprising stars on 28th February, it is called
“2/28” Incident. This incident made the KMT regime labelled as the “alien regime” in the
mind of the local Taiwanese. On May 19th, 1949, the KMT launched the Martial Law in
Taiwan. It prohibited illegal assembly, association, procession, petition and strike.
Besides, it also initialed strict censorship over media and books. Also an enforcement on
a “great China” identity was launched as to sinicize the local people.75 The KMT pushed
several cultural and educational policies and campaigns to achieve this goal. Since 1956,
the KMT carried out a campaign named “Du Zun Guo Yu”, which aimed at elimination of
the use of the local Taiwanese language.
The Taiwan independence movement also had impact on the formation and
manipulation of Taiwanese national identity. One of its priority missions is to contribute
and propaganda a new Taiwanese national identity. For the Taiwan independence
movement, the 2/28 Incident was significant for its attempt to form the exclusive
Taiwanese collective memory. The rapid democratization in 1980s to 1990s offered space
of the propaganda of the Taiwanese national identity. The lift of martial law along with
the expanded freedom of speech reopens the space of discussion and research about 2/28
incident. As a result, the “Great China” identity was gradually replaced by the Taiwan
identity. As for the grass roots, the 2/28 incident can be regarded as a burst out of
Taiwanese consciousness against the KMT regime.
However, after the successful democratization, Taiwan witnessed the rise of civic
nationalism which is the dynamic of the “Sunflower movement”. The rise of civic
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nationalism indicates a prominence for free and democratic liberal values which are
contributing to the further rejection of an ethnonational Chinese identity, which is back
dropped against question of increased economic interdependence on Mainland China.76
Thus, through various research about national identity in Taiwan, it is obvious that
Taiwan citizens’ national identity is both related to their common historical experience,
but also the construction by not only political elites but also the grass roots. As Chen
argues, Taiwanese citizens’ national identity has a two dimensional (primordial and
political) structure. 77
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Resource: National Chengchi University Election Study Center78

As is shown in the graph, the public’s attitude towards the prospect of the relation
with China varies. Other than Unification as soon as possible remaining stable in a low
percentage, other attitude all has fluctuation with time going by. Generally, maintaining
status quo (including Maintain status quo indefinitely and maintain status quo, decide at
later date) takes up high percentage among citizens.
The future of Taiwan, depends on non-committed rationalists. 79They can mitigate
the conflict between the committed advocates over unification and independence. But in
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the long run, the rationalists may change the political equilibrium towards independence
or unification. However, it also depends on whether the external conditions favor
unification or independence. What’s more, Chu argues that the result of presidential
election probably influences the future scenario of the cross strait relations, but it’s not
the decisive factor.
After comparing the national identity theory with Taiwan national identity, several
characteristics are evident. First of all, a conflict which is hard to solve exist between the
cultural or historical identity and the political or realistic identity. Second, though
according to national identity theory, national identity should be constant due to historical
experience. The national identity in Taiwan can be relatively malleable under the
influence of the social reality. Last but not least, national identity in Taiwan is more
evident that bound to be attached to citizens’ voting behavior. What’s more, due to the
increasing influence of the PRC on the other side of the Taiwan Strait as well as Taiwan’s
relation with the US, Taiwan citizens’ national identity, though evident, is still limited.
The pursuit of the sovereignty or self-determinism is constrained by the “One China”
policy. Though the conditions has changed dramatically, the PRC and ROC still have
diversity over the exact meaning of “One China”. To be specific, there is conflict
between the two regimes seeking legitimacy representation as China. As a result, a
potential civic nationalism may appear in the near future with more young generation
participating into the politics. It may result in social movement to drive things hard to
predict.
Though several scholars argue that national identity has the influence over domestic
politics and then influence the prospect of Cross-Strait relations.(Chu 2004; Weng and
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Liu, 2004; Wu, 2005; etc.) But concise empirical test of the correlation between national
identity and voting choice is still needed. Vital questions still remain. National identity
and the future status are still significant variables playing a declining role in overall voter
calculus. The remaining influence that these factors play on voter choice in presidential
elections is not consistent across party identifiers, which makes it harder to predict the
voting behavior according solely on the voters’ attitude towards the issue of identity.
(Balderas and Stockton, 2013)
If a Taiwan citizen identifies him/herself as Chinese, then will he/she be bound to
support the unification with mainland China and will he/she vote for the Pan-Blue camp
which is thought advocating unification with mainland China? Further research with
wider range respondent is needed.
In sum, the transition of Taiwan citizens’ national identity is deeply influenced by
the change in social conditions. But as time goes by, the cognition and perception of who
they are and what they are going to pursue is becoming more and more stable instead of
more extreme. The casual mechanism between national identity and presidential election
is similar as I mentioned in the issue voting part. By the widely recognized issue
ownership, both two Pan-Blue and Pan-Green has there stable voters’ group.
4.3.3 National identity and Politics
National identity has impact over politics not only in Taiwan but also in other
countries and areas. Based on social identity theory, a prediction that a strong national
identity is expected to increase political involvement, which is proved in Huddy and
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Khatib’s empirical analysis in the U.S.80 As an important measurement of the attachment
of nations in the approach of social identity theory, national identity functions as the
dynamic of political involvement, which is also different from the patriotism in the past
researches81. What’s more, the authors uses political attention, knowledge of political
events and voters’ turnout as assessment of political involvement. However, this research
doesn’t distinguish the influence of other factors such as political interest in political
involvement.
Other than democracy lasting for a long time, scholars pay attention to the
countries where the citizens have conflict in their national identity. A widely accepted
theory is that economic factors such as social class drive the election in post-communist
countries after transition to democracy. However, Poland’s situation contradicts to this
theory. In his paper, Krzysztof argues that the past of Poland is still intertwining with the
present. 82 The voters’ voting behavior is determined by multi-dimensions cleavages.
First is that the region divides voters’ voting choice, people in areas controlled by
Germany tend to vote for the Civic Platform (PO) political party, while those people
dwelling in the areas ruled by Russia tend to vote for the Land and Justice Party. Besides,
this division in voting preference is accompanied with another cleavage in citizens’
value. The variety in citizens’ value has impact in their supporting of a conservative
candidates or a liberal candidate. The traditional system of values, which defines Polish
national identity in terms of ethnic nationalism, strong attachment to Catholic dogmas,
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and denunciation of communism as a virtual negation of those values defines and
represents one end of the spectrum and conflict between populist and liberalism The
other end of this continuum is defined more by rejection of this nationalistic-Catholic
“imagined community” than by any positive features. Also, this cleavage has impact over
solidarism-liberalism as the new political cleavage in Poland.
However, in some cases, the national identity doesn’t function as the key
predictor of voters’ voting behavior. After the decolonization and democratization in
African countries, popular election is established in several countries. With a lack of a
national identity establishing the attachment of the nation, ethnic identity becomes the
way that citizens’ identify themselves. It partially accounts for the instability of
democracy and some political violence. However, in Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen’s
research about the voting intention in Africa, the authors analysis 16 countries’ data and
find that the economic interest becomes the uppermost factors in voting intentions instead
of the identity.83
4.3.4 National identity and Taiwan voters
Thus, through studies of other countries, national identity has various impact over
politics. It is unique to Taiwan due to several reasons. First, national identity is the sole
social cleavage that dominates the Taiwan politics. In many other cases such as Poland,
the national identity is combined with the diversity in religion, functioning jointly as the
dominant social cleavage. The Taiwan voters aren’t different so much in their ethnicity.
Second, national identity in Taiwan has impact not only to domestic politics by
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influencing the presidential election but also to international relations. How Taiwan
citizens identify themselves direct reflects how they view China. A hostile China in
Taiwan citizens’ view makes the cross-Strait relation likely to be unstable through
public’s influence on the making of policy towards China. Last but not least, national
identity in Taiwan is inevitable in Taiwan politics. Its formation and transition largely
due to the manipulation of the different parties. As a useful tool to attract and mobilize
voters, national identity is combined with the independence/unification issue. The Panblue camp and Pan-green camp as well as their supporters are polarized by their opposite
position on national identity, constructing the dynamic of party competition and
consolidating democracy through presidential election. As for Taiwan, the national
identity is closely related to the polarized party partisanship. In Su-feng Cheng’s paper,
she uses the “Taiwan consciousness” to explore the effect of national identity in the
presidential election. This “Taiwan consciousness” contains two dimensions’
measurement, including the Chinese/Taiwanese identity and independence/unification
issue. The respondents score 2, 1 and 0 when they identify themselves as Taiwanese, both
Chinese and Taiwanese and Chinese, respectively. While the respondents score 2, 1 and 0
when they tend to support independence, status quo and unification. The result adding
these two scores is the measurement of the “Taiwan consciousness”. 0 means the weakest
while 4 means the strongest. She concludes that voters with strong “Taiwanese
consciousness” tend to vote for the Pan-Green camp candidates while voters with weak
“Taiwanese consciousness” tend to vote for Pan-Blue camp candidates. 84 After tracing
the trajectory of national identity transition in Taiwan, Wang argues that national identity
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in Taiwan sets the boundary between the voters. The ethnic division and their origin of
ancestry is replaced by the Chinese/Taiwanese consciousness. And in the near future, as
this division of national identity remains, this trend tends to change into a united de facto
independent Taiwan against a hostile China.85 Since the two major parties, DPP and
KMT have strongly opposite position on national identity. On the one hand, national
identity is the focus of political dispute in Taiwan. On the other hand, the voters’
partisanship follows this division. In other words, the partisanship is embodied in the
national identity.
National identity is also intertwined with the Cross-Strait relations. It blurs the
voters’ choice. One of the voters’ key concern is that the close economic relation with
China will lead to unification, though the economic integration between Taiwan and
China does accelerate the economic development of Taiwan for China’s cheap labor and
large market. However, as President Ma tried to push policies towards a deeper level
cooperation with China, he faced pressure from citizens. The economic dimension of the
cross-Strait relationship is a significant factor that influenced Taiwanese voters’ decision
in the 2012 presidential election according to Wei, Hung and Tung’s empirical
analyzation which sorted voters into Cross-Strait Relationship Voters and Cross-Strait
Economic Voters. 86Whether they voted for Ma in 2012 presidential election and whether
they are satisfied with Ma’s first term is also taken into consideration in this
classification. Also, as Wu and Lin argued, “The concern with the impact of the negative
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development of the cross-Strait economic relationship on Taiwan’s economy had Ma
Ying-jeou lost the election significantly influenced the decisions of those voters who
were dissatisfied with President Ma’s performance during his first term and yet still voted
for him in the election mainly because of Ma’s position on the cross-Strait relationship.”
87

Although the cross-Strait economic relationship did not directly affect most Taiwanese

people’s economic interests, the cross-Strait economic relationship did influence the
people’s voting behavior because people thought it would impact the Taiwan economy in
general. 88But on the other side, the candidate who’s from DPP or KMT can also have
influence over China’s policy dealing with Taiwan. Since PRC’s standing is valid to
pursue the peaceful reunification, its attitude towards the Taiwan’s activities which
regarded as seeking sovereignty is becoming stronger, along with its increasing military
power. This may make Taiwan citizens becoming more worried about their fate. In
voters’ mind, an ideal situation is that a balance between the PRC and ROC, where the
economic cooperation maintains along with the autonomy of Taiwan. But it’s hard to
achieve. Thus, presidential election is a vital benchmark for the tendency of the future,
though it’s harder and harder to predict.
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V. FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper functions as a preparation of the further research towards Taiwan politics
especially presidential election as one of the main institutions of Taiwan democracy.
After reading the literature about this topic, several questions still need to be answered.
Seeking answers and explanations for these questions is the direction of further research.
First, Taiwan citizens’ national identity is still in change with the development and
consolidation of Taiwan democracy. As the dominant issue of Taiwan politics, the impact
of national identity faces the change of other issues such as the economic justice and
minority groups’ civic rights. Whether the impact of national identity changes in the
voters’ decision-making process should be paid more attention.
Second, with Tsai Ing-wen’s success in 2016 presidential election, gender politics
comes into stage. Whether the difference of gender in voters’ decision making is
becoming more salient is remained to be seen. Besides, whether the females’ political
participation is enlarging in presidential election after 2016 presidential election is also
another topic.
Third, due to the spread of internet, social media plays more and more important
role in politics. It offers new platform for both candidates and public delivering
information. Thus, how does the media influence Taiwan’s presidential election and will
this impact become more salient is another focus of future research.
Nevertheless, potential innovation exists in the methods applied to measure the
citizens’ attitude. For example, a cross time panel analysis can be applied in explaining
the change of citizens’ attitude towards Cross-Strait relations and national identity.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper is trying to seek a review over the Taiwan presidential election. What
influences the result of the election is the question that this paper tries to answer. Based
on the history background, factors that influence the presidential election is sorted based
on three dimensions: issue voting, valence voting and social cleavage. As one of the most
important institution in democracy, presidential election decides the prospect of one state
in the next a few years. Though what influences the result of presidential election in
Taiwan is complex, based on the voting theories, we can find that presidential election
does have similarity as the presidential election in other democratic countries. The voters’
decision is influenced by the issue preference, issue salience and evaluation of the
candidates. But what makes the presidential election in Taiwan special is that Taiwan is
the society with only one dominant social cleavage. National identity intertwines with the
issue independence/ unification and Cross-Strait relations. The presidential candidates
can’t avoid mention this interaction during the campaign while the voters can’t neglect
the impact of the national identity on their choice. But for further research, the national
identity and its impacts over election needs more concise measurement.
As the success of Tsai Ing-wen becoming president in 2016 is regarded as an
important benchmark of Taiwan political development, the gender politics and issues
concern about the minority groups tend to be a more salient issue. Thus, in the further
research, the joint effect of multi-factors should be paid much more attention. What’s
more, the failure of DPP in the local election in the end of 2018 made the prospect of
DPP in 2020 election. While on the other side, the Pan-Blue camp is suffering from
lacking a charming candidates in my opinion. Both Han kuo-yu and Ko wen-je, who are
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elected as the mayor of KaoHsiung and Taipei is unlikely to becoming the presidential
candidates according to the Taiwan media. Thus, the 2020 presidential is becoming hard
to predict, whether there will be a political neophyte is remained to be seen, which may
add some new factors to the Taiwan presidential election.
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